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Abstract: Small-scale and independent water
providers serve up to fifty percent of the population
in urban centers in many of the developing and less
developed countries. However, they remain largely
unrecognized and unregulated. This article argues,
based on the public interest theory and two case
studies of the price and quality of water by small-
scale providers, that there is a compelling case for
regulation of small-scale water provision. The human
right to water imposes an obligation on states to
regulate small-scale water supply market. It also
means that governments should avoid regulation
which does not have support in public interest theory
and empirical facts as this might constitute violation
of the right to water.
Keywords: Small-scale water providers; price and
safety regulation; duty to regulate; and human right to
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is prepared drawing on the key findings
of a research project which explored the legal status,
business models, costs and quality of water by what
are referred to henceforth as small-scale and
independent providers (SIPs). They are known by
different names such as ‘independent providers’,
‘informal providers’, ‘water vendors’, ‘mini-utilities’,
‘non-state providers’, ‘the other private sector’ and so
on. Significant proportions of the population in urban
centers of many developing and less developed
countries depend on them [1]-[3].
In some urban centers, the official providers have
high coverage in terms of size of the distribution
network and number of private connections as in, for
example, Manila where two private operators have 85
and 93 percent service coverage [4]. However, their
performance records as measured by the number of
hours or days the service is actually provided to
customers is inadequate. The demand left unsatisfied
during such period of time as when there is
interruption of service is met by SIPs [5]. A number
of legal and administrative barriers such as the
requirement to cover the connection cost and pay
deposit also prevent many households from being
connected [6], [7]. These households rely on SIPs.
SIPs are pioneers in the development and operation
of water systems in peri-urban, rural and remote areas
where official providers either do not exist or are not
able and willing to serve [5]. They are prominently
present in informal settlements and low income areas.
Official providers are often reluctant to extend
services to such areas because of precarious and
illegal land tenure and a number of other factors [3],
[6], [8]-[10].
SIPs are not limited to particular income groups
and parts of the city; they serve middle, lower and
upper income families [2]. Therefore, when the water
provided by the official utility is not satisfactory,
even well-to-do-residents in formal neighborhoods
resort to SIPs [10]. This seems to justify Solo’s
statement that SIPs are ‘income and class-blind’ [2].
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SIPs have huge potential in serving areas and
groups of people left un-served by official providers.
Their potential is linked with certain features of their
business model which are particularly suitable to the
needs of households whom they regularly serve and
also the conditions under which they often operate
[1]-[3], [8], [10]. In addition, any improvement by the
official utilities is expected not to match the pace of
urbanization and as a result SIPs are likely to remain
for the foreseeable future the only source of water for
the urban poor [10].
Solo reports that some provide water at higher
prices [2]. Studies further suggest that the majority of
unserved and inadequately served populations, who
rely on SIPs and other sources, tend to be mainly the
poor [2], [11]. This puts the poor in a more
disadvantaged position as they pay high prices, not
only per unit cost but higher in terms of affordability,
often ranging from 9 to 20 percent of their income
[12]. The World Bank further observes that such poor
people tend to pay more than their richer counterparts
in the same city [13]
SIPs have further been described as providing
water of questionable quality [14]. Where the water
sources are unprotected, they become susceptible to
external contamination from surface runoffs,
windblown debris, human and animal fecal pollution
and sometimes unsanitary collection methods among
others [15]. Marvin and Laurie further note that
people without access to a formal network usually
buy water from private vendors and that this means
not only having access to more polluted water, but
also more interruptions to supply along with its
associated problems including, among others,
substantial economic, health, social and
environmental costs of uncertain water supply [16].
The WHO further suggests that some may provide
water that may be inadequately treated or transport
water in inappropriate containers creating the
potential of contamination, even for water that may
have been safe [17]. Households who receive their
water supplies from some SIPs are therefore
categorized as not having reasonable access to safe
drinking water.
Lack of legal framework which recognizes the
operation of SIPs is mentioned as the main constraint
[3]. In some countries, as for example in Ghana, the
law prohibits the resale of water [10]. In others as in
Tanzania the operation of SIPs is conditional upon
getting a business license [10]. Even though such
prohibitions or requirements are rarely enforced, their
existence creates a room for officials to harass small-
scale providers as in, for example, Khartoum [10],
[18]. Although in some cases the operation of SIPs is
not clearly prohibited, the official provider is given
the exclusive right to supply water within a certain
defined geographic areas. As a result, operation of
SIPs in such areas is considered to go against the
interest of the official provider, if not the public
interest. The supply of water and sanitation services is
regarded as a natural monopoly and hence
competition in this industry is conventionally
assumed to be undesirable or an unnecessary waste of
resources. It is on the basis of this rationale that
official providers are given a monopolistic position.
However, an attempt to enforce this privilege against
SIPs without managing to extend the formal service
to all residents within that area is unacceptable [19].
As a result of these positions taken by the law in
many countries, it seems, the activities of small-scale
providers are virtually unregulated. The price they
charge is generally uncontrolled by any public
agency. There are no standards of quality imposed
and enforced upon SIPs. On the basis of these
observations, many have argued for the recognition
and regulation of SIPs [5], [10], [20]-[22]. However,
the literature is short on materials dealing with the
need to regulate the price and quality of water by
SIPs. They are not regulated, but should they be
regulated?
This article critically examines the need for
regulation of the price and quality of water provided
by SIPs. The discussion is made drawing on the case
studies carried between September 2006-September
2009 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and Kisumu
(Kenya). Kisumu is the third largest city in Kenya.
Located on the western part of Kenya at an altitude of
1300 meters above sea level, Kisumu covers an area
of about 415 km2. Many of the residents generally fall
into the low income bracket, posing a challenge to
affordable water service provision.
Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia is located
in the central highlands of Ethiopia, covering an area
of 530 km2. The city is at an elevation ranging from
2000-2800 above the sea level. The current
population is estimated at over 3 million and by 2020
it is expected to increase to nearly 6.5 million. This
increase will place enormous pressure on public
service delivery.
II. SIPS IN ADDIS ABABA (ETHIOPIA) AND KISUMU
(KENYA)
A. Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
There is no national government organ charged
with provision of water and sanitation services; it is
rather the responsibility of regional and local
governments. The official water utility, Addis Ababa
Water and Sewerage Authority (AAWSA), is a
department of the city government [23]. It owns and
operates the water supply system in the city and has a
statutory monopoly [23]. Its activities are financed by
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the annual government budget and its revenue reverts
to the general account of the city government.
About ninety-eight percent of the city’s water can
be traced back to AAWSA. This does not, however,
translate into corresponding proportion of households
having their own private connection; only 40 percent
of the households have direct connection to the water
supply network. Significant proportions of the
population rely on SIPs which take different forms.
One form of SIPs is what is called public fountains.
These are kebelle (the lowest administrative unit of
the city government) administered water collection
points. They are operated by individuals employed by
the kebelle administration. However, a number of
them are not currently operational. The remaining
ones operate only for few hours a day.
The other forms of SIPs are owned and operated
by community groups. These are common particularly
in newly settled areas in the outskirts of the city.
Community groups pool their resources together to
get a public standpipe. They also negotiate with
AAWSA to be categorized as public fountains for the
purpose of getting favorable tariff rates [24]. These
are temporary solutions. They remain in operation
until every member of the community group manages
to get his/her own private connection. This is because
once the water supply network had been extended to
the locality it is relatively easy for each household in
that locality to get a private connection.
Also common are neighbor sellers and water
kiosks. They do not have any kind of special
relationship with AAWSA apart from the ordinary
contractual relationship which every customer has. As
such they do not benefit from the flat rate which
authorized standpipes benefit from. They are found
across the city. They regularly serve poor households
who cannot afford private connections for a number
of reasons. In a period of interruption, they also serve
other households who are normally connected to the
official network. Their presence is not restricted to a
certain section of the city. What is different about the
city of Addis Ababa compared to other African cities
is that it was not developed by colonial powers and in
a planned manner. As a result the poor households are
found almost evenly distributed throughout the city.
As these are households who do not have their own
private connections, they rely on water kiosks. Water
kiosks are general grocery shops who sell water by
the bucket.
Recently as the city has expanded in size,
households in newly settled areas have found
themselves very poorly served by AAWSA. Because
of the shortage of water during the long dry season
and other factors, there are times when households in
these areas get running water only once a week. This
has created a business opportunity for mobile water
vendors who transport water by donkey or trucks
from areas where there is running water. The same
people also serve the growing water demand of the
construction sector.
In conclusion, it can be said that SIPs have a large
presence in the city of Addis Ababa. They serve: 1)
poor households that do not have private connections;
2) households in informal and new settlements; and 3)
areas where there is interruption of water supply. It is
difficult to quantify the number of households who
rely on these alternative means of supply as many of
the so-called private connections are also shared
among several households.
It should also be noted that the type of SIPs
common in Addis Ababa are not independent in the
sense of having a separate source of water like wells
and boreholes [5].
B. Kisumu (Kenya)
Kenya is divided into seven main catchments. For
each catchments, a state corporation known as Water
Services Board is established [25]. The Water
Services Boards are developers and owners of the
water supply and sewerage system within their
respective jurisdiction [26]. The water supply systems
are, however, operated by water companies (known
as Water Services Providers, WSPs) based on service
provision agreement with the relevant Water Services
Board [26]. Therefore, a Water Services Board may
contract the operation of water supply and sewerage
systems it develops and owns to different WSPs.
The city of Kisumu is found within the Lake
Victoria South catchments. The Lake Victoria South
Water Services Board (LVSWSB) develops and owns
systems of water supply and sewerage in these
catchments [27]. And Kisumu Water and Sewerage
Company (KIWASCO), currently wholly owned by
the municipality, are contracted by LVSWSB to
provide water and sewerage services in the city [28].
In Kisumu, where the performance of KIWASCO
is limited by not only inadequate network coverage
but also insufficient amount of daily water
production, the demand left unsatisfied is met for by
various forms of SIPs.
Standpipe operators have in most cases a
contractual relationship with KIWASCO. They are
connected to the official water supply network. There
are two kinds of standpipe operators. Some of them
have contractual license to resell water to other
people and are also charged a flat rate by KIWASCO.
There are others who are connected to the official
network like any household and resell water to other
people. They do not have contractual license and
hence are not beneficiaries of the flat rate.
KIWASCO prescribes the price of water to be
charged by the standpipe operators. However, such
restrictions are not adequately and proactively
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enforced. Nor is there a system for the enforcement of
this prescription. Standpipe operators sell water
directly to consumers (usually those households
which are nearby) and to mobile water vendors,
which are the other form of SIPs.
In the last few years, KIWASCO has started
working in collaboration with SIPs in what is called
delegated management model. This is an attempt to
take the already existing standpipe operators beyond
selling water. Accordingly, KIWASCO would extend
the network up to a certain point, extensions from
which are then done and managed by appointed
operators. The water from this point would be
metered and the operator would be charged based on
the meter reading, albeit at a flat rate. The operator
can in turn establish different water collection points
by extending the pipeline from the main meter and
could even connect households directly to the
secondary network. This arrangement is said to be in
the interest of poor households and people living in
slum areas and informal settlements. It is expected to
result in several benefits including, but not limited to
reduction of the level of unaccounted-for water, low
retail prices and increased revenue for KIWASCO.
There are also people who have dug well (or sunk
borehole) in their premises and sell water directly to
consumers and to mobile water vendors. They do not
have any relationship with KIWASCO. They do not
have also a permit to abstract water and in most cases
they are not also required to do so [26].
Whereas mobile vendors normally address the
problem of access resulting from inadequate physical
infrastructure or the unreliability in supply, well and
borehole operators address the problem of access
emanating from the inadequate volume of water
produced by KIWASCO.
Currently there is one small-scale provider which
can be characterized as a mini-utility. Its operation
resembles a conventional water utility except that it is
not involved in water distribution. This provider
abstracts water from Nyamasaria River to its
treatment plant. After the water is treated, it is sold to
nearby households or mobile water vendors. As
opposed to well operators, abstracting water in this
manner requires permit. The owner of this water
supply system has acquired permits for abstracting
water from the river and building the water treatment
facility. In addition, the owner claims to have an
agreement with the LVSWSB to continue supplying
water until KIWASCO manages to extend its water
supply infrastructure to the surrounding area.
Mobile water vendors are also a prominent part of
the water supply system in the city of Kisumu. There
are two main types of mobile water vendors: hand-
cart pushers and tanker-truckers. Hand-cart pushers
are numerous in number. They operate a hand-cart
which carries 12 jerry cans each of which carries 20
liters. They purchase water from standpipe or well
operators and move it around the city in search of a
customer. There are few tanker-truckers in the city;
many of them are owned by businesses and hotels.
This is not surprising considering the start-up capital
which is required for this model of water supply. The
existing truckers purchase their water from borehole
operators or Nyamasaria water works and usually sell
it to high water users such as factories, bakeries and
hotels.
C. Price of Water in Addis Ababa and Kisumu
In Addis Ababa water from water kiosks costs the
highest at 30 Birr/m3 (US$3.09/m3). This is followed
by public fountains (kebelle administered standpipes)
the price of which range from 5-10 Birr/ m3 (US$
0.515-1.031/ m3). The figures suggest that households
getting water from water kiosks pay the highest even
in terms of price per cubic meter which is seventeen
times greater than the rate applied by AAWSA to
households with private connection. It is twenty times
greater than the rate public fountains are charged by
AAWSA (1.45 Birr/ m3). It is ten times greater than
the rate applied by AAWSA to commercial users (3.3
Birr/ m3). Public fountains sell water at 3.45 to 6.90
times the price at which they get water from the
utility. Tap in the yard (neighbor sellers) costs 6.5
Birr/ m3 (US$ 0.67/ m3) while households with
private connection charged at 1.75 Birr/ m3
(US$0.180/ m3) costs the lowest. Households in the
poorly served new or upcoming areas (both poor and
non-poor) without connection seems to generally
incur the higher costs compared to those in older
parts of the city. Household expenditure on water in
Addis Ababa ranges from 7.5 to 54 Birr per month.
The average proportion of household expenditure on
water was lowest among those using yard taps at a
range of 4.5-8.0% or an average of 4.7% of income of
poor households in the wet season. The average
highest proportion of income was spent by those
using water kiosks which totaled to between 19.3-
34.3% (mean of 20.3%) and 28.5-50.7% (mean of
30.0%) of the income of poor households in the wet
and dry season respectively for all the sources
combined. Based on the data on average monthly
expenditure for all sources, low income households,
with their mean monthly income of Birr 193 (US$
94.13), spend an estimate of 10.2% and 15.4% of
their income on water in wet and dry season
respectively.
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In Kisumu handcart vended water costs the highest
ranging from Kshs. 400-500/m3 (US$ 5.97-7.46/m3)
in wet season to
Kshs. 400-1000/m3 (with an average of Kshs.
875/m3 (US$11.19/m3)) during dry season.
Households with connection to the piped network
using official utility first block tariff pay Kshs. 33/m3
(US$0.49) for 1 to 10 m3. Thus those using handcart
vended water pay 12.12-15.15 times paid by those
with household connections during wet (no shortage)
season and much higher during dry season. The
standpipe operators on the other hand get water at
Kshs. 55/m3 (US$ 0.82/m3) and Kshs. 25/m3 in the
delegated model and resell the same at about 150-
200/m3 (US$ 2.34-2.99) for households collecting
directly; they, thus, make a profit about two to three
times what they pay for the same water. Water from a
standpipe owned by Namasariya Water Works costs a
constant price of Kshs. 125/m3 (US$1.86) to
households collecting directly but at a discounted rate
Kshs. 75/m3 (US$1.12) for handcart vendors. Well
water costs the least with household collecting
directly paying Kshs 100/m3 (US$1.492) but handcart
vendors are given at a discounted rate or a wholesale
price ranging from Kshs. 62.50-75/m3 (US$0.93-
1.12) per handcart filled with an average of Kshs.
68.75/m3 (US$ 1.03). This water is in turn sold to
households at the same price as water drawn from the
standpipes/kiosks, thus making a profit of 8.5-13.5
times during wet season and 13.5 to 18.5 times during
dry season. This is contrary to a popular belief that
mobile vendors sell water according to the source
(well or standpipe). For Kisumu, with the exception
of water sold at the standpipe supplied by water from
a small treatment owned by one small scale producer,
generally the cost of water changes with season.
In Kisumu average expenditure on water for all
sources combined amounts to 12.2-16.3% of the
monthly income of poor households in the wet season
and 21.4-28.5% in the dry season. When considered
separately, expenditure on well water was the least
and the data shows that if only using well water,
low income households would spend an average of
4.7-6.3% and 15.8-21.0% of their monthly earnings
in the wet season and dry season respectively.
Expenditure on handcart vended water both during
the wet season and dry season was high with that of
the dry season rising to 50-66.7% of monthly incomes
of poor households but poor households use
handcarts rarely. Expenditure on water from the
independent small scale producer takes about 5.9-
12.5% of the total income of poor households. The
expenditure on water for poor households is slightly
higher than what households spend on house rents.
D. Quality of Water in Addis Ababa and Kisumu
The quality of water from various sources used in
the case study areas was analyzed with respect to the
presence of thermo tolerant coliforms as indicators of
fecal contamination and hygiene. In addition, nitrates
and fluoride were also determined in groundwater
sources.
The quality of water from various sources used in
the case study areas was analyzed with respect to the
presence of thermotolerant coliforms as indicators of
fecal contamination and hygiene. In Both Kisumu and
Addis Ababa the standards for microbiological
quality of drinking water is that given in WHO
Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality: a zero
presence of coliforms in a 100ml sample of drinking
water and ≤ 50 cfu/100ml standard for untreated
community water sources by the case study countries.
There is a suggested relaxed guideline value: ≤
10/100ml for piped water which cannot meet the
current high standard for piped water. Seventy four
percent of all samples (from various sources)
analyzed for thermotolerant coliforms were positive
for thermotolerant coliforms. Overall more samples
from Kisumu were positive for thermotolerant
coliforms than in Addis Ababa as summarized in
Table 1. Piped water collected from public water
taps/standpipes had better microbiological quality
than other sources. However, compliance rate was
higher in Addis Ababa (80%) than in Kisumu
(73.9%) but the difference was not statistically
significant.
Although samples from boreholes from both cities
were few, where thermotolerant coliforms were found
majority complied with the relaxed guideline value (≤
10/100ml) and also with (≤ 50 cfu/100 ml) standards
for untreated community water sources by the case
study countries. There were few samples from tanker
trucks, borehole and springs. No sample from tanker
trucks had thermotolerant coliforms. Levels of
thermotolerant coliforms contamination in samples
from springs and borehole were low. All samples
from households in Kisumu (Table 1) had presence of
thermotolerant coliforms compared to 51.9% for
TABLE I
RESULTS OF THERMOTOLERANT COLIFORMS PRESENCE
Water sources N Positive TTC detects (%)
Combined Kisumu Addis
Ababa
All samples 414 73.7 84 40.2
Tap
(standpipes/house
taps)
81 23.5 26.1 20
Well 98 96.9 96.9 100*
Handcart
container
39 69.2 69.2 -
Household storage 184 86.4 100 51.9
Borehole 6 66.7 50 50
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Addis Ababa and the levels of thermotolerant
coliforms were much higher in Kisumu and
significantly different from Addis Ababa. In Kisumu,
water obtained from wells and stored in the house had
significantly higher levels of thermotolerant coliforms
than tap water stored in the house suggesting
influence of source quality on household water.
Household water quality was significantly different
from well and handcart.
Analysis of microbiological quality along the
supply chains for water from different sources
indicates that there was no significant difference
between tap and well water sampled at the source
(public water tap/standpipe) and that in the handcart
container. This suggests that deterioration in quality
may not occur during transportation by handcarts and
tankers and that transportation by handcarts or
tankers does not lead to deterioration in the quality of
water. This suggests that handcarts are able to
maintain relatively good water quality up to the point
of delivery. This could be due to the short time taken
to collect and transport water to customers or good
hygiene practices. However, this may not be the case
always. Deterioration in quality for tap water occurs
within the household. Comparison of the source water
and water stored in the house shows that deterioration
in water quality can occur once transportation and
storage in the home is undertaken. This is
demonstrated by the deterioration of the quality of tap
water as it is stored in the house (compared to quality
at source). Poor hygiene practices related to water
transport and/or storage can lead to good quality
source water becoming contaminated at the household
level.
Nitrates and fluoride levels in ground water
sources were also determined. The failure rate was
lower than for thermotolerant coliforms. For fluoride,
the standards value for Kenya is 1.5 mg/l which is the
same as that given by WHO; while Ethiopia gives 3.0
mg/l. Fluoride concentration for the water samples
analyzed range from less than 0.5 mg/l to 13 mg/l.
Kisumu had higher concentration reaching up to a
maximum of 13 mg/l while samples from Addis
Ababa had very low concentrations. All the samples
from Addis Ababa and the majority from Kisumu
(71.5%) were within the recommended guideline
value for fluoride (≤ 1.5mg/l). For Addis Ababa all
the samples were, therefore, also within the country
standard set at 3.0 mg/l).
For nitrates the WHO guideline value for nitrate is
50 mg/l as NO3 (11.3 mg/l NO3-N for nitrate as
nitrogen), which is the standard adopted by Ethiopia,
but Kenya gives a maximum of 10 mg/l. Nitrate
concentration (Nitrate as Nitrogen NO3-N) for the
water samples analyzed range from a minimum of
<0.1 mg/l up to 45 mg/l. Kisumu had the highest
concentration reaching up to the maximum of 45 mg/l
while samples from Addis Ababa had very low
concentrations. Overall the majority of the samples
(71.1%) in Kisumu and all the samples from Addis
Ababa were within the guideline (≤ 11.3 mg/l)
suggested by WHO and also the standard used by
Ethiopia. For Kisumu the majority (62.7%) of
samples were also within the Kenya standard of ≤10
mg/l, which was slightly stricter than the WHO
guideline value.
III. THE LEGAL STATUS OF SIPS IN
ETHIOPIA
Ethiopia is a federal state [29]. Powers and
functions relating to the management of water
resources in general and supply of water and
sanitation services in particular are divided among the
federal government and constituent units of the
federation (also called regional states). The federal
government is constitutionally charged with
formulating the legal framework according to which
regional governments manage water resources found
exclusively in their territory [29]. Administration of
water bodies which connect or cross two or more
regional states is, however, the responsibility of the
federal government [29]. Since many of the rivers are
of such a nature, this implies a very limited role for
regional governments.
Water is publicly owned and hence individuals
generally acquire the right to abstract and use water
through the permit system [30]. The federal
government enacted the Water Resources
Management Proclamation in 2000. (The term
‘Proclamation’ refers to a statute that is enacted by
the main legislature in Ethiopia just like the term
‘Act’ is used in other legal systems). The
Proclamation provides that, “…no person shall
perform the following activities without having
obtained a permit from the supervising body; (a)
construct waterworks; (b) supply water, whether for
his own use or for others; (c) transfer water which
he/she abstracted from a water resource or received
from another supplier”. There are some activities
which are exempted from this requirement but none
seem relevant to SIPs. Digging water wells by hand
or using water form hand-dug wells; and using water
for traditional irrigation, artisan mining and for
traditional animal rearing, as well as for water mills
are exempted from the permit requirement [30].
There is no framework law that provides if and
under what conditions the private sector can be
involved in the supply of water and sanitation
services. The only rule is the above provision in the
Water Proclamation which requires permit to supply
water services. What preconditions must be fulfilled
to be able to get this permit is not clear from the
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Proclamation. The Council of Ministers and the
Ministry of Water are expected to enact secondary
legislation setting out the preconditions of and the
conditions attached to the permit to supply water. So
far, however, none of these secondary lawmaking
organs have come up with such law.
The federal government has set the water safety
standards which are basically based on the WHO
guidelines [31]. However there are no effective
mechanisms of enforcing such standards. As far as
safety of water is concerned, AAWSA is expected to
comply with these water quality standards. However,
there are no procedures for monitoring if these
standards are being met. The standards are not also
accompanied by specific sanctions. AAWSA has an
in-built system to ensure the safety of drinking water;
it daily takes samples from different areas of the city
and tests the water for contaminants. But these are not
reported to any outside body and are useful for
purposes internal to the authority. There are no safety
standards that are specifically applicable to the
activities of SIPs.
There is no national regulatory framework
applicable to urban water supply across the country.
In Addis Ababa, the legislative branch of the city
government has the power to determine the tariff
structure [24], [32]. Price determination is a political
issue; if there is any control on how price is
determined, it is only a political one. The current
tariff which is used was supposed to expire on 7 July
2007 [24]. However, it is still in use as the city
government has not been willing to accept the
revision requested by AAWSA. The price charged by
the different forms of SIPs is not currently controlled.
The tariff binds only AAWSA. Public fountains are
charged a flat-rate as they are expected to serve many
households. This tariff structure, however,
discourages households from sharing connections or
selling to others; if they do, since they are likely to be
considered high-volume users, they would heavily
charged.
The federal law requires a permit for the supply of
water for domestic and other purposes [30]. But when
it comes to Addis Ababa this permit is unlikely to be
granted as the law which has re-established AAWSA
clearly prohibits supply of water or resale of water
[24]. However there is an exception to this.
Standpipes, or what are called public fountains by the
law, can be operated with the agreement of AAWSA
[24].
Apart from standpipes licensed by the authority,
there are also water kiosks and neighbor sellers.
Clearly these are operating in contravention of the
legal prohibition. However, this prohibition is rarely
enforced. But the tariff structure which is employed
by AAWSA is supposed to discourage resale of
water: with the exception of public fountains, a
progressive rate is applied. However, the effect of this
progressive rate as opposed to preventing resale water
has merely made water more expensive to the urban
poor who are inadequately served.
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF SIPS IN KENYA
The Kenyan Water Sector has recently undergone a
‘fundamental reform’ introduced through the Water
Act 2002 which came into force on the 18 March
2003 [33]-[38]. Among others, issues of water supply
and sewerage services have been separated from the
wider issues of water resources management [25],
[26].
Water is publicly owned and hence individuals
generally acquire the right to abstract and use water
through the permit system the general nature of which
is outlined in the Water Act and the details of which
are provided in a secondary legislation [39]. The
Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA)
has the power to issue, monitor and revoke water use
permits [26]. It has regional offices the jurisdiction of
which corresponds to the major catchments [25].
There is no single national agency that is charged
with the responsibility of supplying water and
sewerage services in the country. Pursuant to the
Water Act, seven Water Services Boards (WSBs)
have been established with the responsibility to
develop and own water supply and sewerage
infrastructure in their respective service areas. The
boundaries of the service areas of the WSBs
correspond to the boundaries of the major
catchments. The WSBs are licensed to provide water
services and their activities are regulated by a
national regulatory agency, Water Services
Regulatory Board (WSRB) [26]. WSBs are required
to engage the services of WSPs to operate the water
supply system and provide water and sewerage
services in certain defined areas within their service
area [26].
The WSRB, among other things, is also entitled to
approve tariffs used by WSBs [26]. In addition, it
approves any service provision agreement made
between WSBs and WSPs and its subsequent
amendments [26]. The WSRB is also empowered to
determine standards for the provision of water
services to consumers [26]. It is not immediately clear
if this includes water safety standards. The current
water safety standards in the country are however
formulated by the Kenya Bureau of Standards and are
incorporated in the service provision agreement
between, for example KIWASCO and LVSWSB
which also contains financial penalties for non-
compliance [28].
The Water Act does not contain any provision that
expressly deals with SIPs. However, it provides:
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No person shall, within the limits of supply of
a licensee (a) provide water services to more
than twenty households; or (b) supply-(i) more
than twenty-five thousand litres of water a day
for domestic purposes; or (ii) more than one
hundred thousand litres of water a day for any
purpose, except under the authority of a
license.
A person who provides water services in
contravention of this section shall be guilty of
an offence.
If a person supplies water below twenty households
and twenty-five thousand liters per day, he would not
commit the offence. Similarly, a person could
continue to supply water to any number of people and
any amount of water daily as long as they made an
agreement with the relevant WSB and this agreement
is approved by the WSRB. One of the requirements
provided in the Water Act regarding WSPs is that
they must be constituted as a separate entity
exclusively for the purpose of providing water [26].
According to the national legal framework, WSBs
have the monopoly for the supply of water services in
their area of service. The problem with this legal
provision is that it does not admit any exceptions
regarding areas over which it has legal but not
physical competence; this is without overlooking the
limited recognition of SIPs
Coming to the case of Kisumu, it should be noted
that almost all of the borehole and well operators and
mobile water vendors are operating illegally. This is
because they exceed the limit provided in the Water
Act and that they have not concluded a service
provision agreement with the LVSWSB:
 A typical handcart pusher supplies 240 liters
of water per trip and when business is good,
he/she can make up to 15 trips per day.
Thus, a handcart pusher can supply up to
3600 liters of water per day and is in no
danger of contravening the maximum
volumetric limit set in the Water Act.
However, a typical handcart operator is
likely to sell to considerably more than 20
households a day during busy periods. That
means such operator needs to have a service
provision agreement.
 A tanker trucker can deliver 10,000 liters per
trip. Thus, to remain below the threshold in
the Water Act, a tanker trucker may make no
more than two trips per day if supplying
domestic users. Currently the average
number of trips per day is approximately
five, thus delivering approximately 50,000
liters of water a day. Most of those trips are
to supply hotels, factories and construction
firms. Some of these could, therefore, be
considered non-domestic uses and hence a
tanker trucker could lawfully provide up to
100,000 liters so long as it does not supply
more than 20 households.
 Source operators such as borehole and well
operators too are constrained by the limits
imposed in the Water Act. They supply
households directly and indirectly through
mobile vendors such as handcart operators
and tanker truckers. A source operator
cannot legally provide water even to one
handcart operator as it might serve more
than 20 households. They are also likely to
exceed the volumetric constraints of the
Water Act.
Attempts have been made by LVSWSB to register
and offer service provision agreement to well-owners
and borehole operators. But it has not been effective.
The initiative to register the existing well-owners and
borehole-operators by LVSWSB and KIWASCO had
the expressed objective of identifying them for future
support and facilitating intervention measures during
public health emergencies. This is not, however, an
initiative in which SIPs have trust; they suspect that
the registration is a mere precursor to their closure.
They do not also believe in the legitimacy of the
power of these recent government institutions to
police well and borehole operators which have been
in existence for longer period of time. Finally, the
measure of registration and the notion of signing a
service provision agreement are not favorably seen
because it involves a duty on the part of SIPs to pay a
certain percentage of their turnover as a licensing fee
to the LVSWSB. Most importantly, the registration
initiative is being implemented by KIWASCO rather
than LVSWSB. This apparently raises an issue of
conflict of interests.
Only standpipe operators, operators in a delegated
management model and Nyamasaria Water Works are
currently officially recognized.
It should also be noted that currently the price and
quality of water provided by those SIPs illegally
operating and also those officially recognized are not
regulated. The exceptions to this are those standpipe
operators, who have contractual relationship with
KIWASCO which are expected to adhere to the
prescribed retail price which is not being actively
enforced. Nyamasaria water is tested occasionally by
Kenya Bureau of Standards.
V. IS THERE A NEED TO REGULATE SIPS?
A. Regulation in General
The task of ‘defining regulation is by no means a
simple mater’ and yet the literature on the subject is
filled with several such attempts on which there is no
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recognizable consensus [40]. For the purpose of the
discussion at hand, regulation can be defined as “the
promulgation of rules by government accompanied by
mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement, usually
assumed to be performed through a specialist public
agency” [41], [42]. This can be refined further by
excluding certain rules which are non-regulatory in
the sense that they are meant to merely facilitate or
organize human behavior rather than limit it in a bid
to achieve public purposes [43].
Water utilities are subject to various regulatory
standards pursuing economic, social and
environmental objectives [44]. In many cases, water
utilities are regulated by different agencies: one
agency regulating the price, quality of service and
investment levels; another regulating the quality of
water and yet another regulating the environmental
impact their activities [44].
There are two alternative general approaches that
the law might possible take with respect to the small-
scale water provision and providers. First, the law
could positively recognize them (or rather not
prohibit them) without putting any licensing
requirements and standards of conduct and output.
That means any person can at any time anywhere
abstract any water and sell it for any price to any
person and for any kind of purpose. Second, the law
could decide to regulate them. Regulation basically
involves restricting the freedom of SIPs by imposing
entry, conduct and product requirements. For
example, SIPs might be allowed to operate by first
securing license for abstraction and supply of water.
Or they might be required not to sell water beyond a
certain maximum limit. This is the situation in Kenya
where the law states that anyone who intends to
supply more than a specified volume of water or
number of households should do it only on the basis
of service provision agreement. This limitation of
freedom might go to the extent of no freedom as
when SIPs are prohibited from supplying water.
Taken this way, therefore, SIPs are currently
subject to regulatory controls in Addis Ababa and
Kisumu, though these regulatory controls are seldom
enforced. But the real questions are whether they
should have been regulated and if they should, what is
appropriate level and form of regulation.
In what way should the law regulate SIPs is a
second-order question. The first-order question is:
whether the freedom of SIPs should be restricted in
any way? Or is there any prima facie case of
regulation? It is prima facie because any need for
regulation identified at this stage is merely a tentative
conclusion which could be abandoned if there are not
any cost-effective ways of regulation [45]. Separating
the two questions is essential as it helps to avoid
instituting costly regulatory measures which are not
necessary [45], [46].
There are two principal theories of regulation:
public interest and private interest theories [42], [43],
[47]. When the per capita benefit of regulation is
small, individuals have minimal incentive to organize
for the purpose of maintaining or realizing favorable
regulatory terms. In such cases, the government could
easily be ‘captured’ and made to serve the interests of
few private economic actors. Private interest analysis
can be invoked to explain regulation in those
circumstances where its assumptions and premises are
true and no other explanation exists. However, it
could not be cited as a general theory of regulation.
Setting aside the distinction between general and
specific theory, private interest analysis has one
significant contribution. That is, it can be used to
formulate procedural safeguards against regulatory
capture [46]-[48].
The general justifications put forward and found in
the literature are of two kinds: economic and non-
economic [42] [43]. The economic justifications refer
to instances of market failures. The typical argument
runs as follows: markets result in allocation of
resources to the most productive uses and users. The
market relies on prices to achieve this. For this
expected benefit of the market to materialize, there
are certain conditions that must be fulfilled. For
example, a given market should consist of so many
buyers and sellers who, taken individually, are not
significant to influence output or price. Efficient
market requires also that price fully capture the full
cost of production which includes private cost and
social cost. However, the reality of markets of
different goods and services and in different places is
not exactly the same as the ideal market. One or more
of the preconditions are found lacking in many
markets producing what are called market failures. So
market failures supply one set of justifications for the
intervention of the government in the market. Equity
and paternalistic considerations are other reasons of
regulation.
B. Regulation of the Price of Water Services
Water utilities are subject to economic regulation
which involves, among others, control of the price
consumers pay. The existence of natural monopoly is
the market failure that is cited to justify regulation of
price. One response is to regulate competition with a
view to prevent the formation of monopolies [49].
However, the formation of monopolies might be
desirable and in some ways unavoidable—the case of
natural monopolies [42], [43], [45], [49], [50]. In
such cases, attempts should be made to regulate price.
This is a general argument in favor of regulation of
prices. However, economists argue that the existence
of natural monopoly by itself is no good reason for
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regulation. The case for regulation becomes stronger
where the demand of the commodity is not highly
sensitive to price changes. It is in such cases that the
natural monopoly is expected to behave in
inefficiently manner by increasing price and
decreasing output [45].
Likewise, the price of water should be regulated
because the market for the supply of water and
sewerage services is said to be a natural monopoly
[44], [49]. Supply of water services involves three
distinct processes: production, distribution and retail
[49].
The distribution aspects of the water supply exhibit
more attributes of natural monopoly than other public
utilities such as electricity and gas: among others,
high capital intensity, the need to have excess capital,
and low marginal cost of transporting additional
water [49], [51]. There is some doubt as to whether
competition in the supply of water services is possible
among producers of water just like there is a
competition among generators of electricity. In the
regulation of water companies in England and Wales,
for example, the economic regulator is also charged
with promotion of competition among existing
companies under certain conditions. However, it is
generally accepted that competition among
companies in the production of water raises some
complex regulatory issues regarding quality and
access to common carriage [52], [53]. Robinson
identifies four challenges of introducing competition
into the water [54]. First, he states that there might be
significant public objections to a permission to
develop new water supply sources [54]. Second, high
costs of transporting water long distance have
precluded the development of a national grid of water
distribution as opposed to gas and electricity and this
further limits the practicality of competition in water
[54]. Third, mixing water in a common network raises
question as to the responsibility of each producer for
failure to meet water quality standards [54]. Fourth,
related to the third challenge, the separation of
economic and social regulators complicates the
challenge of introducing competition into the water
sector [54]. If common carriage is to be used, it
requires that all water consumers are metered and in a
situation where many households pay a flat rate,
introducing competition would be challenging [54].
Robinson admits that these challenges are not
insurmountable and argues in favor of introducing
competition through inset appointment, cross-border
competition, or requiring open access on regulated
terms or separating the ownership of the distribution
infrastructure. Perhaps the strongest argument which
is not mentioned by Robinson is that competition
precludes the use of cross-subsidies as a tool to make
the price of water affordable to certain sections of the
population by allowing high-volume water users to be
able to switch or self-supply. It should be noted in
this connection, though incidentally, that the values of
introducing competition into the water sector might
be a justification to allow the operation of SIPs which
do not raise any issue of how to regulate common
carriage and mixing of water from different sources.
The natural monopoly characteristics of the water
sector therefore justified economic regulation of
water utilities. One task of economic regulation
involves setting the price of water based on the cost
of its production, distribution and disposal. By basing
the price on the cost of water, the objective is to
avoid both overproduction (consumption) and
production (consumption) of water services [51]. So
long as regulation is solely concerned with ensuring
efficient utilization of resources, its mission is to
mimic a competitive market and set a price which
would have prevailed had it been possible and
desirable to have a competitive market [55]. The
result of this might be, however, a price which may
not be affordable to some section of the society,
people for whom the price is expensive and hence
would have bough more of it had it been cheaper.
There will be at the same time people for whom the
price is cheaper for whom the price is not expensive
and hence would have bought the same even if the
price is higher.
That regulation is concerned largely with attaining
efficiency might be true in most cases. But it should
be pointed out that there are other values such as
equity that undercut public policy. Hence price
regulation should also be about ensuring equitable
outcomes. Once it is accepted that price regulation
should also be concerned with equitable outcomes, it
follows that it might be necessary to set the price at a
level which is below that which would have prevailed
in a competitive market (below marginal cost). By
doing that attempts could be made to make it
affordable to all or at least to the greatest section of
the population; so that they would be able to buy
more of it than they would have done otherwise.
Therefore, making the prices of water services
affordable is also another objective of economic
regulation.
A number of reasons could be provided to explain
why regulation should also be concerned with making
water affordable. Affordability has implications on
public health as well as the sustainability of the whole
water supply systems. So it appears in the public
interest and in some ways also in the interest of water
providers that water services are affordable.
If water services are not affordable, then it means
that some people would have less of it than that which
is strictly required to lead a healthy life. The result
may be a spill-over effect in the public health system.
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Expensive water means not only less water but also
less of any other necessities of life [51], [56].
There are a number of policy tools that can be used
towards making water services affordable to the
largest section of the population [56]. The first and
which is often preferred by economists and consumer
associations is direct governmental subsidy to make
up for the difference between what a customer affords
to pay the water company and what it costs the water
company to serve that particular customer [57]. This
is a non-regulatory solution and in this the water
provider is merely a cooperating partner of the
government. The following are some of the
regulatory tools.
One of the regulatory tools involves setting a tariff
structure that allows and requires cross-subsidization
and prohibiting water resale or self-supply and legally
recognizing monopoly in order to make the program
of cross-subsidization effective. In addition, adopting
regulatory requirements that help to minimize the
costs of the water supply system will go a long way
towards making water affordable. This includes
adoption of an appropriate mechanism of price
regulation. For example, rate-of-return approach to
price regulation does not provide the right incentive
to use the efficient level of capital; on the contrary it
encourages water companies to ‘gold-plate’ the
supply system and hence increasing the problems
associated with affordability [58], [59]. Setting a
standard on the minimum proportion of the bill that
should be collected as more bills are collected means
the price would be lower. The regulator should
regulate the quality and performance of the
distribution system to reduce the level of water
unaccounted for.
Considering the structure of the market for small-
scale water provision and the nature of providers, the
question now is whether the above discussion leads to
regulation of price. When it comes to SIPs, the first
point that should be noted is the fact that they follow
a different kind of business model. First of all, the
market is characterized by little or no sunk cost. The
kinds of SIPs that currently operate in the case study
areas have been described earlier. Mobile vendors
such as hand-cart pushers serve as ‘virtual pipelines’
overcoming the huge sunk cost involved. The same is
true with respect to small-scale water production.
Second, they operate in competition with one another.
The fact that these form of providers have emerged in
the water supply sector is also one good reason to
suspect that the water supply sector is not in fact a
natural monopoly in some cases.
There is no problem of natural monopoly in small-
scale water supply market. It is on the basis of this
that some have argued against price regulation [10],
[60].However, the studies of water prices in the case
studies show that there are serious problems of
affordability in Addis Ababa and Kisumu. But these
problems cannot be solved or minimized using price
regulation.
Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no
prima facie case for price regulation as far as SIPs are
concerned for two reasons. First, the market for
small-scale water provision is not a natural monopoly.
Second, price regulation of SIPs does not solve the
problems of affordability.
C. Regulation of the Safety of Water
Conventional water utilities are subject not only to
price but also safety regulation. There would often be
a separate regulatory agency charged with the task of
developing water quality standards and ensuring that
water utilities comply with these standards.
Regulation of the quality of a monopoly service or
product can be justified on the basis of natural
monopoly as a market failure. Natural monopoly
gives the producer unfettered market powers to not
only set the prices but also determine the quality of
the product. The monopoly would not have any
incentive to improve the quality of its product
particularly when the product is an essential product
and there are no alternatives. The incentive of the
monopoly to improve quality is more diluted when it
is subject to a price-cap regulation [61], [62].
Therefore, just in the same way that regulators are
concerned with price, they should also be concerned
with the quality of the product or the service. It has
already been explained in the previous section that
the conventional market for the supply of water
services is a natural monopoly. Therefore, regulators
should set not only the price but also the quality of
water provided by conventional water utilities.
If this was the only justification for regulating the
quality of drinking water, the following would have
been the natural outcomes. First, the same agency that
regulates prices would also do quality. The quality of
water services has two dimensions. The first
dimension is the quality of customer interface. This
involves setting standards regarding, for example,
handling of customer complaints, water pressure,
procedures for repair, connection or disconnection
and enforcement of such standards. To this extent it is
true that the same organ that regulates price is often
endowed with powers to regulate quality. The second
dimension is the quality of the water itself. This
involves setting and enforcing microbiological,
chemical and physical attributes that drinking water
should possess. To the extent this is so, the above
outcome does not reflect the reality in many countries
where economic regulators are not directly involved
in the setting and enforcing of microbiological,
chemical and physical standards.
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Second, since, as it is stated in the previous section
and also confirmed in the case studies, small-scale
water provision is a competitive market, there would
be no need to be concerned with the quality of
drinking water by SIPs.
There are some who followed the second line of
reasoning and who argued that there is no need to be
concerned about the quality of water provided by
SIPs. In its Field Note on SIPs in Manila, the Water
and Sanitation Program of the World Bank took
account of the issue of whether consumers found it
safe to drink or not [4]. The fact that the majority of
the customers have found the water drinkable is not
an adequate ground to rule out the possibility of
regulating the safety of water. Often it is the case that
safety and public perceptions of safety do not
coincide. McIntosh also makes the same point: “to a
large extent, the market promotes regulation through
customer choice concerning price and quality of
water” [8]. Such lines of arguments are based on
premises that, as long as there are many buyers and
sellers in a market each too small to influence the
market outcome and so long as there are no
significant entry and exit barriers, there is no need to
control the quality of goods and service. This is not
however necessarily true.
Markets result in efficient outcome when, among
other things, the participating economic actor have
sufficient information required for making informed
decisions [63]. Markets leave the power of decision-
making to individual economic units on the
assumption that they will make the best choice for
themselves and the society. Making such decisions
requires sufficient information. The problem with
certain markets is that the required information is not
available or is difficult to discover or comprehend.
Even if there is a possibility for a separate market that
supplies the required information to emerge, such
market by itself is pervaded with problems of
incentives. Information has a public good nature with
characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry
resulting in diminished incentives for individuals to
be involved in its production and dissemination
compared to other economic goods [64]. When the
problem of information is manifested in the form of a
buyer having inferior information regarding the
quality of a product in comparison to what the seller
has, it is argued that this will result in the continued
deterioration of quality.
Akerlof argued the market for second-hand cars is
not always efficient [65]. It is surrounded uncertainty
generated by information asymmetry, unequal
information between buyers and sellers. The owner-
seller knows the real quality of his car. The buyer
does not have that advantage. All he knows is the car
may be either very good or ‘lemon’. Faced with this
uncertainty, the buyer is willing to pay only an
average price. Those who believe their car is worth
more than the average price would leave the market.
Only those who have cars worth less than the average
price remain in the market. This process will continue
until only ‘lemon’ cars remain in the market. The bad
cars would drive the good cars out of the market.
Further researches in the field of economics and
marketing have refined this hypothesis. Now the
accepted view is that the market itself would take care
of the problem of information asymmetry. And it is
only when the information asymmetry relates to the
experience (in some cases) and credence (in most
cases) attributes of a product or service that
regulatory response is justified.
The quality attributes of a product are of three
types: search, experience and credence [63], [66]-
[68]. Search attributes are those which can be
ascertained (assessed) prior to purchase. On the other
hand, experience attributes are those attributes of a
product which cannot be assessed prior to purchase;
however, it can accurately be assessed after purchase
and experiencing the product. There are attributes of
a product which cannot be known even after
purchase; these are known as credence attributes. A
given product may have alls search, experience and
credence attributes [69]. For some goods, the
attribute that is most relevant may be its credence or
experience attribute. Which attribute is most
important in the decision to purchase depends on the
preference of a particular consumer. These are also
attributes of services. Compared to goods, it is
believed that many of the quality attributes of services
are characterized as credence attributes [70].
The ramifications of information asymmetry and
the appropriate response turn on the form of attribute
over which there in unequal information between the
contracting parties. Assuming the information
asymmetry affects the search attribute of a product
and it is the search attribute that is considered
significant by consumers, does this result in a ‘lemon’
market as suggested by Akerlof? Information
asymmetry affecting only the search attribute of a
problem can be overcome by spending some amount
of time and money. The buyer could pay a mechanic
to check the car on his behalf. Or the buyer could
spend some time examining the physical attributes of
the car or checking other dealers and so on.
Advertisements are also explained as a way of
minimizing search costs by informing consumers of
the existence and price of a product [71]. Information
asymmetry affecting search attributes do not,
therefore, pose significant problem as they can easily
be overcome by buyers. The widely accepted legal
maxim, buyers beware, can therefore be justified with
respect to search attributes.
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How about experience attributes? Experience
attributes by definition, as stated above, are those
which can be known after purchase and consumption.
Whether a product possesses the requisite attribute
will be known after the first consumption. The
question here is whether information asymmetry
affecting experience attributes of a product would
result in a lemon market as suggested by Akerlof?
The answer is not necessarily. This is because of a
number of reasons.
If a product is one which is frequently purchased,
the seller will have the incentive to produce a product
which possesses the requisite experience attribute, for
buyers would punish it by opting for an alternative.
With respect to such products, therefore, it can be
observed that the market is a self-correcting
institution. The problems are more pronounced in the
case of durable products which are not frequently
purchased. Even then, brand names and reputation
operate to minimize problems of information
asymmetry in experience attributes [69], [72], [73].
To some extent also it is in the interest of the
producers (sellers) to provide some pre-sale
information regarding experience attributes. Free
samples and test products could be explained as a
way of overcoming information asymmetry. The
problem with attributes which cannot be examined
before purchase is that consumers would not be
willing to pay for them and hence it would be in the
interest of producers to do as much as possible
provide such pre-sale information and through that
develop willingness to pay on the part of the
consumers. Advertisements play an important role.
For durable products, after-sale services and
warranties by sellers increase the willingness of
consumers to pay for alleged experience attributes
[71].
The problem of information asymmetry is more
pronounced in the case of credence attributes, those
which cannot be verified even after purchase and
consumption. In such cases, it is possible for
Akerlof’s ‘lemon’ market to emerge. If consumers are
not able to verify whether or not a product or service
possesses a certain desirable credence attribute, then
they will not be willing to pay for it. It also means
that the producers would not have any incentive to
incur costs to improve the credence attribute of a
product. When the really important attribute of a
product cannot be verified before and after
consumption, consumers tend to make a decision
taking the search and experience attributes as a proxy
[70].
This finding has an important implication. If
consumers take physical appearance which is a search
attribute as a proxy for experience attributes or search
and experience attributes as a proxy for credence
attributes, producers would have an incentive to
spend greater than optimal amount of resources into
perfecting the search and experience attributes.
There is a strong case for regulation of quality
when there is great deal of information asymmetry
with respect to the credence attributes of a product or
service. This is the main public interest explanation
for quality (safety) regulation and consumer
protection even in markets where there is a great deal
of competition. This argument applies in a range of
markets.
Coming to the market for the supply of water
services, in particular the market for the supply of
drinking water, the fact that it is a natural monopoly
justifies regulation of not only price but also quality.
Regulation of the quality of drinking water is also
required even when the market is characterized by
competition. In other words, competition among
waters service providers does not necessarily result in
improved (safe) drinking water. On the contrary,
considering the fact that the most relevant safety
attributes of drinking water are credence attributes,
that they cannot be confirmed even after purchase and
consumption, one might reasonably expect a ‘lemon’
market (or literally a market of dangerous waters).
SIPs operate in competition with one another.
Competition in this respect has two aspects: price ad
quality. Price competition involves lowering the price
which is a good thing for consumers. Competition on
quality of water should encourage them to improve
the quality of water. Improving the quality of water
has the effect of raising the price of water as doing as
requires investments in the treatment of water and
protection of sources from contaminants which
ultimately add up to increase the price the consumer
is expected to pay. The advantage is: by improving
water quality (assuming the price of alternatives is
constant), one could expect to get additional
customers if the improved quality is appreciable and
the increased price because of the improved quality
does not exceed what customers are willing to pay.
But the willingness to pay of customers depend on
whether they can tell, by simple inspection of water
for the improvement of which the provider has
invested a certain amount, that provider’s allegation
about quality is true. That means consumers are
expected to be willing to pay a certain premium
which corresponds to the improved quality as
observed by color, taste or smell. The consequence of
this is that SIPs, even in cases of competition among
themselves on quality, are expected by economic
rationale to invest only in improving the color, sell
and taste of water they are selling.
This has four potential consequences. First, there
would not be real meaningful investments in
enhancing and treating or care in maintaining the
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chemical and microbiological quality of water.
Second, there would be inefficient investment in
improving the physical quality of the water—
flavoring and dying it in different colors and tastes.
Third, worse cases, they would resort to measures
that would cause the deterioration of the chemical and
microbiological quality of the water while making it
smell, taste and look better. Fourth, even the optimal
level of investment for enhancing the physical quality
of water is not guaranteed as the price of competitors
does not necessary remains constant. When one
provider invests that level of effort and capital on
physical attributes of its water that the consumers are
willing to pay in the form of increased price, the other
providers would lower their price making sure that
the difference between your price and theirs will be
high enough to influence customers to choose theirs.
Even if you have invested optimal amount of effort
and money to improve the physical attributes of the
water and even if that is appreciated by customers,
the difference between ones’ price and that of the
competitors no more corresponds to what customers
are willing to pay.
The problem emanates because of the difficulty of
determining the quality of water. The physical
qualities are its search and experience attributes and
the chemical and microbiological qualities are its
credence attributes. As far as safety of drinking water
is concerned, the most important are its
microbiological and chemical qualities. However,
consumers would be able to easily determine whether
given water is safe chemically and microbiologically.
As a result they would rely on its physical attributes
as proxies and that would have undesirable
consequences. That consumers would routinely use
physical attributes is also confirmed in some surveys
measuring consumers’ perception of safety.
One would argue that insufficient information by
itself is not important since the market will be able to
correct this by itself. For example, in frequently
purchased products and services information
asymmetry with respect to its experience attribute is
not a problem as the buyer would soon ascertain if the
product possesses the requisite experience attribute
and would punish or reward the seller depending on
the outcome. The problem as far as safety of water is
concerned is that even if it is a frequently purchased
product, the real attributes that matter from health
perspective are also credence attributes and hence the
market would not self-correct in the above sense.
The efficiency-based public interest case for
regulating the quality of water provided by SIPs is
also supported by the spill-over effects of consuming
unsafe water. Water borne diseases impose significant
costs on the public health system and the general
economy. That means the effect is not restricted to
the person who has consumed unsafe water. This
strengthens the public interest case for control. The
public health implications of the safety of water has in
certain cases resulted in court order requiring
connection to public water supply even when the
individual concerned does not want it [74].
But not least there are also equity concerns
surrounding the safety of drinking water. Poor
households, as the largest category of SIPs customers,
are also the prime victims of the adverse health
ramifications. In conclusion, therefore, it can be said
that there is a strong prima facie public interest case
for control of SIPs with the objective of ensuring that
the water they are providing is safe to drink.
Market failures such as information asymmetries
and externalities are strong grounds for regulation
when they are accompanies by private law failures.
The relevant private law in the case of water resulting
in adverse health effects is tort law. If tort law works
perfectly, one would expect that the threat of being
liable to pay damages provides adequate incentives to
providers with respect to the quality of water.
However, tort law does not always work perfectly.
Tort law is not adequate when potential defendants
are not able to pay full the damage they are made
liable to pay. In this regard, the relative size of the
asset of the defendant compared to the probable
magnitude of harm is important. In the case of SIPs,
their assets compared to the public health risk they
pose are negligible and hence tort law cannot provide
adequate incentives. In addition, difficulties of
proving causation and identifying the particular SIP
responsible for the harm would dull the deterrent
edge of tort law.
The above need for regulation of the quality of
water provided by SIPs is bolstered by key findings
of the water quality studies. It is found that the quality
of water, from sources other than the official provider
in Kisumu mainly, well-owners is unsatisfactory.
Well-owners allege that they invest in technologies of
water treatment. This is not verifiable nor is there a
guarantee that such technologies are consistently
used. In addition, standpipe operators in Kisumu
express their concern that mobile vendors source
water from wells and boreholes and sell it as if it was
from standpipes. The standpipe operators are
obviously concerned because they are losing their
competitive advantage. But this point, most
importantly, underscores the inability of consumers to
discriminate between mobile vendors based on the
safety of water they are providing.
It is also found out from the water quality study
that there is not significant deterioration in the quality
of water during transportation. This concerns mobile
water vendors. This might be explained by the short
period of time for which the water is transported. But
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most importantly, it might have to do with the fact
that mobile vendors take measures that would
maintain the quality of their water (washing of their
jerry cans)—the purpose is to market their water
rather than being concerned with the safety of the
water per se. Such mobile vendors cannot afford to
ignore the cleanness of their jerry cans as it can easily
be picked up by potential buyers. At the same time, it
might be mentioned here that black
VI. THE RIGHT TO WATER: TRANSFORMING THE
NEED INTO AN OBLIGATION TO REGULATE
A. Introduction
Individuals in Ethiopia and Kenya have the human
right to water which is generally based on the
International Bill of Rights and their interpretation.
There are also other international human rights
instruments specifically dealing with the right to
water, albeit with respect to specified groups such as
children. Whether the right to water is a derivative or
a stand-alone right is debatable. The extent of
entitlement it confers on individuals and the extent to
which it is justiciable are also fraught with
controversies. However, at a minimum, it requires the
government to establish a regulatory framework that
has the objective of ensuring that water services
provided by third parties such as SIPs are safe and
affordable. Therefore, the human right to water
requires governments in Ethiopia and Kenya to set up
a legal framework for the regulation of SIPs and such
duty to regulate arises when there is a need to
regulate. The extent of the need to regulate SIPs has
already been discussed and the right to water
transforms this need into a legal obligation.
B. The Human Right to Water in International
Human Rights Law
The first human rights instrument to expressly
mention water is the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979
[75]. Article 14(2) of this convention states that
“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination in order to ensure, on a basis
of equality of men and women, that they participate in
and benefit from rural development and, in particular,
shall ensure to such women the right…to enjoy
adequate living conditions, particularly in relation
to…sanitation…and water supply”. This might be
explained on the basis that lack of adequate water
supply and sanitation services has huge burden on
women [76], [77].
The second and only other binding instrument of
international human rights to explicitly state water is
the Convention on the Rights of the Child [78].
Considering the particular impact of poor water
services on infant and child mortality, Article 24 of
this instrument obliges States Parties to take measures
to “combat disease and malnutrition, including within
the framework of primary health care, through, inter
alia, the application of readily available technology
and through the provision of adequate nutritious
foods and clean drinking-water, taking into
consideration the dangers and risks of environmental
pollution”.
Even if these two international human rights
instruments explicitly mention water, they are flawed
in many ways. First, they are not comprehensive; for
example, in the case of the latter, the emphasis is on
the quality (safety) aspects of water [79]. And both of
the conventions do not provide any additional
clarification on the scope of the right and the
corresponding obligations [79].
The three instruments which together constitute the
International Bill of Human Rights, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPRs), and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCRs), do not contain any
specific and explicit reference to the right to water
[80]-[82]. This does not, however, mean that the
drafters have opted against recognizing water as a
human right. The failure of the draftsmen of the Bill
of Human Rights to explicitly recognize water as a
right could be interpreted in two ways. First it could
be the case that the drafters have considered water so
fundamental that there was no need for explicitly
provision [83]. Or that they had not ‘realised that
water was to be such a scarce resource in the future’,
and the idea is to read the right to water into any of
the explicitly recognized rights such as the right to
life, health, to adequate standard of living or to life
[83].
The right to life is the most fundamental of all the
rights: “All other rights add quality to the life in
question and depend on the pre-existence of life itself
for their operation” [84], [85]. It is also “one of the
more controversial rights, due to the inherent
problems in defining its scope at the peripheries”
[84]. There has been a noticeable shift in the scope of
the right to life as understood in international human
rights law. The initial understanding was that it
merely imposes an obligation on the state not to
arbitrarily and unlawfully take the life of individuals
[86]. The earlier narrow interpretation of the right to
life is based on the now obsolete distinction between
civil and political rights on the one hand and
economic, social and cultural rights on the other hand
[87]. Earlier proponents of the recognition of water as
a human right attempted to present it as a right
implied into the generally recognized right to life
[76]. This is also consistent with the recently
accepted broader interpretation of the right to life
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[88], [89]. However narrow view of the right to life
one may have, it could still be argued that it includes
protection against arbitrary and intentional denial of
access to sufficient water [76].
The right to health is provided in Article 12 of the
ICESCRs which provides, in parts, “the States Parties
to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health” [82].
Considering the importance of having access to
adequate, safe and affordable water to the physical
and mental health of individuals, one could also argue
on this basis that the right to health should include the
right to water.
Article 25 of the UDHR provides that “everyone
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care
and necessary social services”. Likewise, Article 11
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights is concerned with the right of
individuals to an adequate standard of living. It partly
reads: “The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family,
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to
the continuous improvement of living conditions”.
The use of the term ‘including’ in Article 11 is taken
to imply that the list is merely illustrate; it is not
meant to exhaustively contain the elements essential
for an adequate standard of living. On this basis,
therefore, it is argued that water can be read into this
provision as it is an essential element of an adequate
standard of living [76]. The Committee on
Economics, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCRs) has
relied on the right to health and adequate standard of
living enshrined in Articles 11 and 12 of IESCRs in
formulating its General Comment on the right to
water.
C. The Right to Water in Ethiopia and Kenya
The term ‘water’ is specifically used in Ethiopian
Constitution in two places. The first is with respect to
the powers of the federal government: that it has the
power to administer water bodies connecting or
crossing two or more stated [29]. The second
reference is to be found in the part of the Constitution
which lists national objectives and policies. These are
expected to guide the activities of governments at the
federal, state and local levels. The extent to which
this part of the Constitution is immediately applicable
is not clear. One of the social objectives is: “to the
extent the country’s resources permit, policies shall
aim to provide all Ethiopians access to public health
and education, clean water, housing, food and social
security”.
Despite the fact that the Constitution does not
expressly recognize the right to water, it should be
noted that it contains a number of provisions which
imply the right to water. These rights are not merely
civil and political rights but they include a number of
economic, social and cultural rights.
Article 13(1) prescribes “all federal and state
legislative, executive and judicial organs at all levels
shall have the responsibility and duty to respect and
enforce” these rights and freedoms. This indicates
that such rights and freedoms as recognized in the
Constitution impose not only negative but also
positive obligations on government organs. This is
consistent with the current thinking in international
human rights. In addition, Article 13(2) stipulates that
interpretation of the fundamental rights and freedoms
enshrined in the Constitution has to conform to
international human rights law and treaties such as the
UDHRs and the ICCPRs. International human rights
law is relevant not only as an interpretive tool but
also as part of Ethiopian law. Article 9(4) recognizes
all international agreements ratified by Ethiopia as an
integral part of the law of the law.
Article 14 states that “every person has the
inviolable and inalienable right to life, the security of
person and liberty”. This is further elaborated in
Article 15: “every person has the right to life. No
person may be deprived of his life except as a
punishment for a serious criminal offence determined
by law”. With respect to this right governmental
organs at all levels have the obligation to not only
respect but also ‘enforce’. It is not clear if the term
‘enforce’ includes positive obligations and if so what
kind of positive obligations are included. This needs
proper constitutional interpretation, as one of the
most fundamental rights in the Constitution, right to
life is also to be interpreted in accordance with
international human rights law. In this regard,
therefore, one should take note of General Comments
6 and 14 on the right to life by the Human Rights
Committee. Accordingly, therefore, governments at
all levels have positive obligations with respect to the
right to life. In addition, the following are some other
provisions which could be construed to include the
right to water. Article 41(3) states that “every
Ethiopian national has the right to equal access to
publicly funded social services”. Article 44(4)
provides that “the state has the obligation to allocate
an over increasing resources to provide to the public
health, education and other social services”. Article
43 is concerned with the right to development and it
reads in part: “The peoples of Ethiopia as a whole,
and each nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia in
particular have the right to improved living standards
and to sustainable development”. Article 44 also
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provides that “all persons have the right to a clean
and healthy environment”.
The present constitution of the Republic of Kenya
does not contain any reference to the right to water.
However, Article 43 of the Draft Constitution which
is the subject of referendum makes a specific
provision regarding the right to water: “every person
has the right to clean and safe water in adequate
quantities”. Even if there is no particular national
legislation which specifically recognizes the right to
water, one can argue that the state of Kenya as one of
the States Parties to the International Bill of Rights is
bound by the obligations emanating from the right to
water.
D. The Content of the Right to Water: General
Comment 15
However recognized the right to water is, a
problem still exists as to the content of the right to
water and the corresponding state obligations. There
has been a great deal of uncertainty until the
publication of General Comment 15 which sets out
the normative content of the right to water [90].
Determining the scope of this right is essential
because as Gleick remarked ‘a right to water cannot
imply a right to an unlimited amount of water’ [83].
Paragraph 6 states that “priority in the allocation of
water must be given to the right to water for personal
and domestic uses. Priority should also be given to
the water resources required to prevent starvation and
disease, as well as water required to meet the core
obligations of each of the Covenant rights” [90].
The right to water is said to contain two elements:
freedoms and entitlements. “The freedoms include the
right to maintain access to existing water supplies
necessary for the right to water, and the right to be
free from interference, such as the right to be free
from arbitrary disconnections or contaminations of
water supplies” [90]. The “entitlements include the
right to a system of water supply and management
that provides equality of opportunity for people to
enjoy the right to water” [90]. Elements of the right to
water must be adequate for human dignity, life and
health [90]. The adequacy of water has several
dimensions: availability, quality, physical
accessibility, economic accessibility, non-
discrimination and information accessibility [90].
E. Implications of the Right to Water
One of the questions that can be raised in relation
to the human right to water is as to whether there is
any value added by the human rights perspective to
the national and international efforts to expand access
to safe and affordable water: how does the human
right status of water help in expanding access to safe
and affordable water?
Anand asserts that a human right based approach to
water legitimates the Millennium Development Goals
and highlights taking action as an obligation and not
as a matter of gratuity [91]. Stated in other words, it
transforms the development goals from horatory and
aspirational to legally binding targets [79]. There are
some who are cynical about the value added by the
human right rhetoric to the water sector [91], [93]. In
order to understand the significance of the right to
water in ensuring access to safe and affordable water,
one has to go beyond the content of the right and see
the duties which flow from the right [92]. It is now
generally accepted that human rights give rise to five
kinds of duties: respect right of others; create
institutional machinery essential to realization of
rights; protect rights/prevent violations; provide
goods and services to satisfy rights; and promote
rights [92]. It should be noted that the qualification of
‘progressive realization’ affects only certain type of
state duties [94]. The General Comment 15
categorizes specific state obligations emanating from
the right to water into three categories: obligations to
respect, to protect and to fulfill [90]. But most
importantly General Comment 15 recognizes that the
right to water requires states to regulate water
providers: “where water services (such as piped water
networks, water tankers, access to rivers and wells)
are operated or controlled by third parties, States
parties must prevent them from compromising equal,
affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe and
acceptable water. To prevent such abuses, an
effective regulatory system must be
established…which includes independent monitoring,
genuine public participation and imposition of
penalties for non-compliance” [90].
VII. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHT
TO WATER: CONCLUDING REMARKS
The right to water which can be based on a number
of rights expressly recognized in national
constitutions and international human rights
instruments impose a number of obligations on
governments. Traditionally such obligations were not
taken seriously on the ground that they are subject to
resource availability. But in recent years a consensus
has emerged that only certain obligations of
governments are subject to resource availability. The
duty to protect, for example, as opposed to the duty to
provide, is not a resource intensive obligation and is
often taken as immediate obligation. One of these
obligations is the duty to regulate. The General
Comment 15 specifically deals with this duty. It is not
also restricted to conventional water utilities.
Therefore, it can be argued that governments in
Ethiopia and Kenya have the duty to regulate the
operation of SIPs with the view to ensure that the
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water they are providing is safe. The need for
regulation of the safety of water has already been
discussed. The right to water transforms this need into
a duty to regulate.
As opposed to some of the views in the literature
on small-scale water supply, it is found that there is
no public interest case for price regulation
considering the unique model that such market is
based on. Studies of water prices in the case studies
show that there are serious problems of affordability.
But these cannot be solved or minimized by
regulating price. On the contrary, it would only raise
the price by driving out some providers and by
making some households unattractive to serve. Price
regulation when there is no need might therefore
constitute arbitrary interference and hence violation
of the right to water [90]. However, governments
must and should take some general regulatory and
non-regulatory measures to make water by SIPs
affordable. These include avoiding costly and
inappropriate regulatory measures such as prohibition
of the activities of SIPs. Therefore, the right to water
does not merely transform an identified need into a
state duty to regulate. It has also implications on the
manner and content of the regulatory regime. Some
forms of SIPs may rightly be exempted. And with
respect to the others, non-conventional, cooperative
and participatory approaches to regulation must be
explored.
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